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Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis: 
The Experience of the French Civil Code 
Olivier Moreteaut 
I. Introduction: The Civil Code as a Straight-Jacket? 
Since 1 789, which marked the year of the French Revolution, 
France has known no fewer than thirteen constitutions.1 This fact is 
scarcely evidence of political stability, although it is fair to say that the 
Constitution of 1958, of the Fifth Republic, has remained in force for 
over thirty-five years. On the other hand, t he Civil Code (Code), 
which came into force in 1804, has remained substantially unchanged 
throughout this entire period. It has been amended many times, espe­
cially since the last war, to take into account t he equality of women and 
to m odernize the law of divorce. However, many of its nearly 2,300 
articles remain intact. Small wonder that it is sometimes referred to as 
"the Civil Constitution"2-legal stability exists where political stability 
has been lacking. 
Lawyers in common law countries tend to consider the codified 
civil law systems as restrictive and mechanical. The Code is seen as a 
constraint, with judges obligated to make a mechanical application of 
its provisions whenever a case arises which corresponds to the situation 
described in the Code. Under such a conception, the court is seen as 
"a sort of judicial slot machine. "3 
t Maitre de conferences (Associate Professor), Faculte de droit, Universite Jean Mou­
lin, Lyon 3, France; Associate Director, lnstitut de droit compare Edouard Lambert; Visiting 
Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, fall 1992, and Boston University School of 
Law, fall 1993 and 1994; Visiting Fellow, Kingston University. Doctorat d'Etat de droit, 
Universite Jean Moulin, Lyon 3, France. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 
Faculty at the University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, on September 30, 
1994. I am indebted to Professor David Gruning, Loyola University School of Law, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, for hi·s helpful comments, and to Stewart Newcombe, Barrister, Consult­
ant to Etude Chaine, notaries in Lyon, for his very precious contribution to the final version. 
1 Six of the thirteen constitutions arose in the revolutionary period beLWeen Septem­
ber 3, 1791, and May 18, 1804, this last being the constitution whereunder Napoleon became 
emperor. There have been four republican constitutions, two monarchial constitutions, and 
one of January 14, 1852, whereunder Napoleon III became emperor. 
2 PAUL DusoucHET, LA PENSEEjURIDIQUE AvANT ET APR.ts LE CODE CML 92 (1991). 
3 See RoscoE POUND, THE SPIRIT oF THE CoMMON LAw 170-71 (1921) ("As a critic has 
put it, the theory of the codes in Continental Europe in the last century made of the court a 
son of judicial slot machine. The necessary machinery had been provided in advance by 
legislation or by received legal principles and one had but to put it in the facts above and 
take out the decision below. True, this critic says, the facts do not always fit the machinery, 
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There is no doubt that this presumption is wrong for most codes 
in civil law countries. Certainly, it is not correct as far as the French 
Civil Code is concerned, as that Code does not contain many detailed 
provisions. True, a certain number of rather precise articles exist, for 
example in the chapters on property, but most provisions are phrased 
in the form of general rules. Moreover, these rules are succinct and 
well written. Stendhal, one of the greatest writers of the 19th century, 
expressed a deep admiration for the elegance and conciseness of the 
French Civil Code.4 Consider the following example: "An y  act by 
which a person causes damage to another makes the person b y  whose 
fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation of such damage."5 
It is precisely in the law of tort that the difference in approach 
between common law countries and the countries with codified sys­
tems is so apparent. In the former countries, the courts look at each 
case and apply legal principles extracted from precedents which they 
themselves have created. In the latter, the courts have to apply general 
principles enunciated by the legislature to a particular set of facts. Par­
adoxically, although countries such as France claim to be the heirs of 
Roman law, in fact in many ways the Roman lawyers used the case-by­
case pragmatic approach of the common lawyers. 6 Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the case of the Roman law of tort, a point 
which will be developed later. 
The general principles are by no means confined to the law of 
tort. The following examples are typical of the generality of the rules 
to be found in other parts of the Civil Code: 
Agreements legally entered into have the force of law for those who 
have made them. They can only be revoked by their mutual assent, or 
for causes that the law would allow. They must be performed in good 
faith.7 
Duress exerted against a party obliged under a contract nullifies the 
contract, even when exerted by a third party.s 
Duress exists whenever a reasonable person may be influenced by the 
the fear of exposing his person or property to a substantial and pres­
ent harm. The age, sex and condition of the person have to be taken 
into account. 9 
[The sale] is perfect as between the parties  and property passes by l aw 
and hence we �ay have to thump and joggle the machinery a bit in order to get anything 
out: But even m extreme cases of .
this departure from the purely automatic, the decision is 
attnb�ted, not a� �II to .the thumpmg and joggling process, but solely to the machine.") . 
. . 
When wntm� his famous novel, La Chartreuse de Pa1'71U, Stendhal used to read a few 
proV1s1ons every day m order to perfect his style. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GousEAUX, I 
TRArrt. DE DRoIT CIVIL, IITTRooucnoN GE:NERALE 94 (2d ed. 1983) (citing letter from Sten­
dhal to Balzac (Oct. 30, 1840)). In the 20th century, Jules Romain, in his celebrated play, 
Knock, also recommended reading the Civil Code in order to fight insomnia. Id. 
� CODE CML [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.). 
Set gmn-ally WILLIAM W. BucKU.No & ARNoLD D McNA.JR ROMAN LAw AND COMMON 
U.w (1965). 
· 
' 
7 C. CIV. art. 1134 (Fr.). 
8 C. CIV. art. ll ll (Fr.). 
9 C. CIV. art. 1112 (Fr.). 
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to the buyer as against the seller, as soon as they have agreed on the 
thing and on the price, even if the thing has not been delivered or the 
price has not been paid. 10 
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The preceding list is by no means exhaustive, and is merely illustrative 
of the general couching of terms within the Code. Perusing the Civil 
Code, it soon becomes apparent that judges have wide discretion in 
interpreting its provisions. For example, in applying Article 1382 of 
the Code, 11 the judge has to decide what the term "damage" means. Is 
it limited to damage to the person or to property? Does it cover eco­
nomic loss or mental suffering? The task of defining these terms is left 
to the courts. Similarly, Article 1111, 12 relating to duress in contract, 
gives no precise definition of duress. The courts will have to decide 
whether such things as economic duress are covered by the code provi­
sion. The entire Code uses such general terms without giving a 
definition. 
The courts possess great freedom to interpret the Code as they 
think fit. For instance, they can hold that the provisions of Article 
1583, 13 which states that property passes by law to the buyer at the time 
of the contract, does not create a mandatory rule but rather only ap­
plies when parties have not otherwise stipulated.14 Unlike common 
law courts, decisions by French courts do not create binding 
precendents, although decisions of the Cour de cassation (the court of 
highest jurisdiction) do have persuasive authority.15 
Given the relative flexibility of judges to interpret the general 
terms in the Code, how then could we get the idea that codes are 
straightjackets? Two reasons can be proposed. The first reason is 
comparative. Traditionally, lawyers in America, England, and other 
common law countries regard the law as being made by the courts. 
When faced with a very precise, concrete question, the judge responds 
by applying a particular rule, which may be distinguished in a subse­
quent case if the sitation in the latter case is slightly different. A legal 
rule is therefore a precise rule. The legislative technique reflects this 
conception. In common law countries, a statute has to deal with par­
ticular problems with detailed provisions, therefore leaving little room 
for judicial interpretation. Therefore, many people in common law 
jurisdictions tend to regard the law in a codified system as rigid, be­
cause they tend not to appreciate that the civil law legislature is con­
tent with enunciating general principles and are thereby necessarily 
lO c. CIV. art. 1583 (Fr.). 
11 C. CIV. art. 1382 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 5. 
12 C. cw. arL 1111 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 8. 
13 C. civ. arL 1583 (Fr.). See supra text accompanying note 10. 
14 Judgment of June 26, 1935, Cass. req., 1935 D.H. 414 (Fr.); Judgment of Jan. 24, 
1984, Cass civ. Ire, 1984 Bull. Civ. I, No. 31 (Fr.). 
15 RENE: DAVID, FRENCH LAw, ITs STRucruRE, SouRcEs AND METHODOLOGY 179-86 
(Michael Kindred trans., 1972). 
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leaving a large margin for interpretation.16 
The second reason is political. Lawyers in civil law jurisdictions 
traditionally insist that in a democracy, the law should be created by 
the representatives of the people. This idea comes from Montes­
quieu's concept of separation of powers,17 an idea which is the basis of 
the American Constitution. In France, since the time of the French 
Revolution, it has remained heretical to admit openly that judges can 
be lawmakers or that they may have some normative power. 
French lawyers certainly admit the existence of something which 
may be described as case law. They call it 'jurisprudence."18 Any stu­
dent textbook or general introduction to the study of the law will ad­
mit that while some rules may be created by judges, the legislator is the 
only direct lawmaker.19 Jurisprudence (in the civil law sense of judge­
made law) is always described as an indirect source of law. 
In France, more than in any other civil law country, this remains 
the prevailing ideology. French lawyers worship what they call "posi­
tive law," the law created by the French legislator. Like Austinians, 
they cannot dissociate the law from the authority of the State. 20 The 
legislator alone has authority to create the law. When the judge is re­
quired to fill a gap in the law, he has to find the support in the text of 
the Code, and it should not be presumed that his ruling may be bind­
ing. The judge contributes to the law, but does not create it. 
As always, one has to look back to history to understand such an 
attitude. Yet, this Article will have the effect of pointing out that the 
Civil Code was actually meant to be a safeguard. 
11. Historical Perspective: The Civil Code as a Safeguard 
The main purpose of the Code has been to unify the law of the 
country. Its style shows that it was meant to be understood by the ordi-
16 Id. at 78. Da�d compares the attitudes of the French and English lawyers with re­
spect to the concepuon of legal rules. Id. He then goes on to explain that to an English 
lawyer, the French legal rule "does not have the precision that is the essence of such a rule. 
Rather, it is a legal principle." Id. 
17 M Cam . 0�ur�u, THE SPIRIT OF lliE LA"'.s 156-67 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 
bndge University Press 1989). Montesqmeu, drawing from principles espoused by John 
Locke, develo�d one of the cornerstone concepts of the American Consitution-separation 
of powers. In his 1669 work, Fundamental Coruitutionsfor the Government or Carolina, which was 
wntten m Monte 
· ' 
· Se 
'J squ1eu s capacity as cretary of the Lords Proprietors of Carolina he set 
forth the basic premises of the doctrine. 
' 
18 Th
.
e term "juri�prudence" as used in this context should not be confused with juris­
prudence m the Amencan and English sense of the term, which is more of a philosophical 
concept. 
19 &t, t.g .. BoRJs STARCK, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT 342-48 (Henri Roland & Laurent 
Boyer eds., 3d ed. 1991). 
20 Rooouo SACCO, LA CoMPARAJSON jURIDIQUE Au SERVICE DE LA CoNNAISSANCE Du DRorr 51-59 (1991) (illustrating how difficult it is for lawyers to reconcile the fact that behind 
�:� authonty of the State, the ?nly lawmaker, many other forces are at work, such as judges 
law pr?fessors, that contnbute to the creation of the law). See inl'ra notes 64-87 and accompanying text. , .. 
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nary c1tlzen. Without denying a possible contribution by the judiciary, 
the codifiers meant the Code to safeguard the citizens against any form 
of judicial arbitrariness. 
A. The Purpose of the Code: Unification of the Law of the Country 
During the centuries following the rise of the French monarchy, 
the French kings strove to unify the country. When Hughes Capet21 
was made king in 987, he only had direct jurisdiction over a very small 
part of the kingdom, called the Domaine Royal. The Domaine Royal cov­
ered n o  more than a fifth of the country, mainly Paris and the "Ile de 
France." Other provinces remained under the jurisdiction of very pow­
erful local lords who kept fighting for independence. It took the skills 
and the efforts of kings like Charles VII (with the help of Joan of Arc), 
Louis XI, Francis I, Louis XIV, and Louis XV to impose a strong royal 
power and the idea of a centralized State. 
Yet, these kings never managed to impose a system of law on the 
whole country. In France, unlike in England where a centralized sys­
tem of royal courts soon imposed a common law,22 the judicial power 
was not in the hands of royal judges. Justice was chiefly local. The 
local parlements23 were sovereign courts of justice in their provinces, 
and the Parkment de Paris did not control parlements in Bordeaux, Tou­
louse, Aix-en-Provence, or Dijon. 
The northern half of France remained a pays de coutume (a land of 
customary law) with a mosaic of local customs, and the southern half a 
pays de droit ecrit (a land of  written law) where the Roman law was 
chiefly applied. A few major statutes ( ordonnances royaks) had been 
promulgated during the reigns of Charles VII, Francis I, Louis XIII , 
Louis XIV, and Louis XV. The statutes, however, only achieved unifi­
cation in some limited parts of the law, such as real estate, gifts, and 
successions.24 However, even this limited unification paved the way 
and indicated that: (I) legislation was the only possible way to unify 
the law of the country; and (2) sound unification implied an accepta­
ble compromise between customs and Roman law. 
During the 18th century, under the influence of philosophers like 
Voltaire and Rousseau, the French people came to realize that they 
21 Capet was the founding king of the dynasty that ruled over the country for 800 years 
until the time of the French Revolution in 1789. See FRANCOIS OuvIER-MARTIN, H!SToIRE Du 
DRoIT FRANCAIS DEs 0RIGINES A I.A RtvoLUTION (1948). 
22 The term "common" refers to the fact that the law was common to the whole country. 
23 This term should not to be confused with the English term parliament, which refers 
to a governing legislative body. 
24 By the Ordonnance de Montil-les-Tours of 1454, Charles VII ordained that the customs of 
the various territories should be written down. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN Kon, Al< INTRO­
oucr10N TO COMPARATIVE LAw 78 (1948). This task was never completed, but it helped in the 
development of a common customary law of France (droit coutumier commun) without which 
the attempt to unify the law through codification would probably have been in vain. Id. at 
78-79. 
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were one nation. As Voltaire said in his well-known ironic style, it was 
absurd for a traveller to change law as often as he changed horses.25 
d f "fyi h . 26 Legislation came to be seen as the mo e o um ng t e nation. 
In 1791, the Constituent Assembly (the first national assembly 
during the Revolution) decided by a u nanimous vote that a code 
should be drafted.27 Yet, the turmoil of the Revolution did not favor 
such a project. At the end of 1799, despite several votes, nothing had 
been done in that respect.28 It took the genius of the first Consul, 
Napoleon Bonaparte, to revive the spirit of the dying Revolution and 
to fulfill the project of a code. On August 13, 1800, he appointed a 
committee of four members to prepare the draft of a civil code which 
would be discussed and voted on by the legislature.29 
The idea was not new. The royal ordinances of Louis XIV and 
Louis XV had already been prepared by specialized committees of 
prominent jurists. But the energy and the genius of Napoleon, who 
took a strong interest and a personal part in the realization of the pro­
ject, made it possible to produce a comprehensive code within a very 
short period of time: the whole code was enacted in 1804.30 
The members of Napoleon's committee, four prominent jurists 
(Tronchet, Bigot-Preameneu, Maleville, and Portalis), actually repre­
sented the two systems of customs and written law. Never did they 
claim any intention to create a completely new system. They endeav­
ored to use all their knowledge, experience, and wisdom to effect a 
smooth transition between the past and the present so that the Code 
could be a dual compromise between the laws of the North (customs) 
and the South (Roman law), and between the ideas of the past and the 
revolutionary ideal. 
While in exile, Napoleon said: "My true glory is not that I have 
won 40 battles; Waterloo will blow away the memory of these victories. 
What nothing can blow away, what will live eternally, is my Civil 
Cd "ll1 Th . . 
_
o e. 
. ere 1s a certam degree of truth in this emphatic 
statement. 
Smee the time of the Revolution, France has had approximately fifteen 
. 25. Voltai�e once said: "Is it not an absurd and terrible thing that what is true in on
e 
Village is false m another? What kind of barbarism is it that citizens must live under different 
laws? 
· · · When you travel in this kingdom you change legal systems as often as you chang e  
horses." Id. a t  8.  
26 See grnerally MONTESQUIEU, supra note 17. For a standard treatise coveri ng t h e  history 
of French law before the French Revolution, see FRANc;;o1s OLMER-MARTIN, H1sro1RE ou 
DROIT FRAN�S DES 0RJGINES A IA REVOLUTION (1948). For a brief survey of this period, see 
ZwtIGERT & Kon, supra note 24, at 76-86. 
. 27 ZwtIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 24, at 83 ("A code of civil law common to the whole 
kingdom will be drawn up."). 
: On the law of the revolutionary period (known as droit intermidiaire), see id. at 82-86. 
Id. at 8�-86. See generally jEAN-Lou1s HALPERIN, L'IMPOSSillLE CooE CML ( 1992) · 
30 The vanous parts of the French Civil Code had been enacted by way of thirty-six s
La
eparate statutes during the years 1803 and 1804. The Code was re-enacted as a whole by the w of March 21, 1804. 
31 Al . Le am vasseur, Cede Napoleon or Code P<malis�, 43 Tut. L. REv. 762, 764 (1969). 
1995] THE FRENCH CML CODE 279 
constitutions, but has always kept its Civil Code, which has been de­
scribed as the "civil constitution" of the country.32 Although it has 
been amended many times, the structure and many portions remain 
unchanged. 
B. The Styl,e of the Code: Legislating for the Ordinary Citizen 
The style chosen by the drafters of the Code is an indication of 
their intention to protect the citizen against the wrongful interference 
of the judiciary. The drafters also intended it to b e  non-technical. It is 
almost free of the legal jargon often used by professionals to establish 
their authority and protect their power. Like the text of a constitution, 
it is meant to be understood by ordinary citizens, without the interfer­
ence of verbose lawyers, who sometimes strive to make the law more 
complicated than it really is. 
Interestingly, it is not so in all the civil law countries. The German 
Civil Code, known in German as the Biirgeliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), is 
by comparison a very technical text that only a professional lawyer can 
understand. This is due to the fact that historically, the main authority 
in German law was the professor. German law is based on a very so­
phisticated analysis of Roman law sources, chiefly the Pandects, by far 
the most comprehensive part of Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. Until 
the time of Bismarck, there was not one Germany but a mosaic of small 
States with their individual supreme courts.33 These supreme courts 
used to refer to academic work in order to decide complicated cases.34 
The BGB, which came into force on January 1, 1900, almost a 
hundred years after the French Civil Code, is a pure product of the 
work of scientists.35 It is full of complicated terms and abstract con­
cepts. It contains a general part and some special parts, the latter to be 
construed on the background of the general part, resulting in hun­
dreds of cross references. 
This reference to the German experience is presented to show 
that there is no single method for making civil codes. The French 
method is more the product of history than legal science.36 For all the 
32 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
33 Once the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation had been abolished in 1806, 
the German Supreme Court (the Reichskammergmcht), which had been created in 1495, 
ceased to exist. See Francis Deak & Max R heinstein, The Development of French and Gennan Law, 
24 GEO. LJ. 551, 568-70 (1936). 
34 This tradition dated back to the Middle Ages, when judges used to refer to the "com­
mon opinion of doctors" (opinio communis doctorum). See gmerally Helmut Coing, The Roman 
Law as /us Commune on the Continent, 89 L.Q. REv. 505 (1973) (discussing the influence of 
l�gal education during the Middle Ages in spreading Roman legal concepts throughout con­
tinental Europe). For a general survey of the historical development of German law, see 
ZWEIGERT & KoTZ, supra note 24, at 133-43. See also Deak & Rheinstein, supra note 33, at 568-
70. 
35 See ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 24, at 150-51. 
36 It has been retained or imitated inter alia in Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, 
Louisiana, Quebec, and most Latin American countries. Id. at 100-22. On the other hand, 
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reasons given, it retains the distinctive character of being a safeguard, a 
"civil constitution" of the country. Its style makes it more comparable 
to the American Constitution than to any U.S. statute. 
It is worth noting that when the French Parliament introduces 
amendments into the Civil Code, it tries to preserve the Code's origi­
nal architecture and to draft the new provisions in the same, simple 
style. If the new provisions are long and technical, then, despite the 
fact that they refer to questions dealt with in the Code, they are placed 
instead in auxiliary statutes. The Law of 1978 on consumer credit 
agreements,37 the Law of 1985 on road traffic accidents,38 or the De­
cree of 1955 relating to land registration39 are a few examples of such 
auxiliary statutes. These auxiliary statutes, like the mass of French leg­
islation enacted during the second half of this century,40 are often as 
technical and detailed as American legislation. 
C. The Paradox of the Code: Trust or Distrust of the judiciary? 
Of course, as indicated above, the judge can play a more creative 
role when applying the Civil Code than when construing these obscure 
statutes. In fact, the Code's draftsmen intended judges to play just 
such a role. For example, Portalis, the most prominent of the four 
drafters, was a political moderate, a fact made clear in the preliminary 
speech he delivered to the Assembly charged with enacting the 
Code.41 Portalis explained the two extremes that legislators should 
avoid: oversimplification-"leaving citizens without rule or guarantee 
concerning their greatest interests"42-and going too far into details­
keeping "clear of the dangerous ambition of wanting to forecast and 
regulate everything. "43 Indeed, "society's needs are so varied, the in­
tercourse between them so active, their interests so manifold, and their 
relations so extensive that the legislator cannot possibly provide for all 
eventualities. "44 
Extremely detailed rules, it was thought, could not resist evolution 
the German model has been imported in Greece, the former Soviet Union. Hungary. and 
some other East�m European. countries. Id. at 159-60. Yet, many countries like Italy, Switzer­land,
3
�nd Austna are greatly mfluenc.ed by German scholarship. Id. at 153. C. CIV. art. 1914 (94th ed. Pellts Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 78-22 of 
Jan. 10, 1978). 
� C. CIV. art. 1384 (94th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 85-677 of 
July 5, 1985). 
39 C. CIV. art. 2203 (94th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying D. No. 55-22 of 
Jan. 4, 1954). 
40 These statutes are often consolidated in some very technical codes like the CooE GtNtRAI. DES IMPOTS (Dalloz 1993) (Taxation Code) CODE DE LA SECURITE SOCIALE (Dalloz 1994) (Social Security Code). CoDE DE L'URRANISME 
'
(Dalloz 1994) (Town Planning Code). 
41 M. Schael Herman, Excerpts From A Discourse On the Code Napoleon By Portalis And Case law And Doc_":'� By A. Esmrin, 18 Lov. L. REv. 23, 24-28 (1972). See Levasseur, supra note 31, 
at 76J-74 (c111ng excerpts translated by M. Shae( Herman). 2 Levasseur, supra note 31 at 769 
4� Id. 
' . 
41 Id. 
1995] THE FRENCH CML CODE 281 
and would have to be amended too often, which creates insecurity. 
According to Portalis, this is not what legislation ought to be: 
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the gen­
eral propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be fertile 
in application, and not to get down to the details of questions which 
may arise in particular instances. It is for the judge and the jurist, 
imbued with the general spirit of the laws, to direct their 
application. 45 
Turning to the method of interpretation, Portalis made a clear 
distinction between the task of judges from that of legislators. 
When the legislation is clear, it must be followed; when it is obscure, 
we must carefully analyze its provisions. If there is no particular enact­
ment, custom or equity must be consulted. Equity is the return to 
natural law, when positive Jaws are silent, contradictory, or obscure 46 
Then, he made this magnificent statement: 
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and the former 
does not resemble the latter. The legislator's science consists in find­
ing in each subject the principles most favorable to the common good; 
the judge's science is to put these principles into effect, to diversify 
them, and to extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application, 
to private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the Jaw when the 
letter kills. 47 
He c oncluded on the value of experience: "It is for experience gradu­
ally to fill up the gaps we leave."48 
It was therefore admitted that judges may contribute to the evolu­
tion of the law by way of judicial interpretation. The judge is meant to 
complement and update the work of the legislator. But the text is 
there, general but clear. It cannot easily be distorted, and it is there­
fore a good safeguard. 
The conception advocated by Portalis implied a certain degree of 
trust placed in the ability of the judiciary. The judicial reforms under­
taken during the Revolutionary and Imperial periods justify such an 
optimistic view. A centralized court system had been created, with a 
supreme court at the top, the Gour de cassation, something France never 
had before. And officially at least, judicial appointments were made 
regardless of social and feudal privileges. 
Yet, the French have never totally lost their prejudice towards the 
judicial system, which they regarded, rightly, as subservient to an all 
powerful ex ecutive. They have always been apprehensive that judicial 
power might be abused. This fear, no doubt, arises from the judicial 
abuses inflicted on the French people under the Ancien Rigime. Even 
today, French judges still enjoy little prestige or esteem. They are eas-
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 771. 
47 Id. at 772. 
48 Id. at 773. 
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ily criticized both by the population and by politicians. They are n oth­
ing but a special category of civil servants. 
Prior to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which was enacted 
on October 6, 1958, there was no judicial review of legislative power. 
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic created a Constitutional Court 
with very limited jurisdiction.49 Yet, when the Frenc� constit':1tioi:ial 
judges have attempted to develop a check on the exercise o f  legislative 
power,s0 their attempts are denounced as leading to potential govern­
ment by judges.51 
As a matter of fact, the French Constitution of 1958 prefers the 
term autoriti judiciaire ("judicial authority") to that of pouvoir judiciare 
("judicial power").52 The latter term would parallel the American 
terms legislative power and executive power. The word "authority" was 
meant to be weaker than the term "power."53 
For these reasons, despite the important powers vested in them, 
judges have kept a low profile. During the 19th century, French judges 
claimed to do an exegesis of the Code or, in other words, they inter­
preted the Code strictly. Exegesis as a technique of interpretation has 
often been described in France as being a servile and literal interpreta­
tion. This is not exactly true. Some brilliant comparatists54 and at 
least one French scholar55 have provided evidence of the creative work 
made by the so-called "Exegetical School" in the 19th Century. 
49 FR. CoNST. arts. 56-63. When a statute has been passed, certain representatives of the 
executive or the legislative branch may, before the promulgation of the statute, challenge its 
constitutionality before the Omseil constitutionneL When held to be unconstitutional, the stat­
ute i� ineffecti�e and cannot be promulgated. However, if no timely submission to the Conseil 
am.st1tutltmntl 1s made, the statute is promulgated and its constitutionality cannot be ques­
tioned by anyone before any court. 
. . �o For . an authorit.a_tive survey of this evolution leading to a more developed system of 
JUd1cial reVlew, see Louis Favoreu, Le cimtrole de ccm.stitutionnaliti des nonne.s juridiques par le 
Omseil constitutionnt� 1987 REvuE FRAN�SE DE DRorr AoMINISTRATIF (R. FR. D. AoMIN.] 845. 
51 In July and August 1993, the Conseil con.stitutiannel was called upon to review six im­
portant
.
statutes designed to enforce the newly appointed Balladur Government law and or­
der pol�cy. �n Augu�t 13, 1993, the Conseil con.stitutiannel held that some provisions of a 
statute imposing a stnct control of immigration were unconstitutional. The next d ay, Mr. 
Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior, declared on the television channel TF 1: "The 
Omseil consti�utionntf m_ore and more rules according to expediency than according to the 
great repubhcan pnnc1ples. As everyone may notice, there is a real drift. Yet, sovereignty 
belongs to the people." Michel De Jaeghere, Minorite de blocage, 378 LE SPECTACLE ou MoNDE 
10 (1993) (a press article presenting the conservative opinion that judges should not be 
allowed to challenge the government policy once accepted by the representative of the 
people). 
s· 
Edouard Lambert, wh?.
in 19�1 founded the Institute of Comparative Law at the Univer­
•ty of Ly.on, expressed cnt.Jcal Views of the U.S. Supreme Court's anti-progressive govem­ment by judges. Set gmerally EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GoUVERNEMENT DES juGES ET LA LUTfE 
CoNTRE v. Ltc1stATION Soc1ALE AUX ETATS-UN1s. L'ExPtRJENCE AMtRICAINE DU CoNTROLE Ju01c1AIRE DE lA CoNSTITUTIONNALrrt DES Lois (1921) . 
52 FR. CoNST. art. 64. 
5' Ste PHILIPPE ARDANT, INSTITUTIONS PoLITIQUES E T  DRorr CoNSTITUTIONNEL 586 (1991). 
54 Set gmerally JoHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAw (1978) 55 PhT R. 
. 
1 •ppe emy, Eloge de l'txigist, REVUE DE LA REcHERCHEjURIDIQUE DROIT P ROSPECTIF 
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The judges' work may look conservative, since they referred to 
some old historical sources such as the coutume de Paris, royal ordi­
nances, Roman law, texts of Domat,56 or Pothier (whose works in flu­
enced the drafters a great deal).57 Yet, they also knew how to promote 
a sound evolution, considering the law as a system and working on the 
assumption that the Code declares rather than creates the law.58 
During this period, judges had to keep a low profile and to act as 
if everything they said naturally flowed from the provisions of the 
Code, as if they were merely giving effect to the legislators' intention. 
The fact that French judicial decisions contain no individual opinions, 
but are a brief summary of the majority opinion, with virtually no refer­
ence to the arguments presented, greatly assisted judges in maintain­
ing the fiction that they were merely following the Code. It is enough 
for the court of highest jurisdiction to state: "According to article 1384 
paragraph 1, the law is thus." Such a statement gives everyone the im­
pression that the solution is at least dwelling implicitly in the Code 
provision. Such statements also made the shift to a more daring atti­
tude possible. 
III. Modern Developments: The Civil Code as an Alibi 
At the turn of the century, judges did much more than simply 
keep alive the Code they revered. In order to circumvent some obso­
lete rules and modernize the law, they did not hesitate to depart from 
the obvious intention of the legislator and move away from traditional 
principles supporting some Code provisions. Nonetheless, they kept 
paying lip service to the Code, citing its provisions as the direct source 
of their judgments. Such a use of provisions of the Code may be de­
scribed as "legal fiction." Yet, in the present context, the word "alibi" 
has been preferred: When accused of departure from the text, the 
judge can answer that he did not commit the crime of acting as a Iegis­
lator59 but remained within the framework of the provision which was 
cited. 
A study of the development of the law of tort is particularly illus­
trative. The law of tort is contained in five Articles of the Code, 1382 
254 ( 1982). The best key towards the understanding of the law of that time is found in 
CHRISTIAN AT!AS, EPJSrtMOLOGIEjURIDIQUE 21, 47 (1985). 
56 LES LOIS CMLES DANS LEUR 0RDRE NATUREL (1689-1694). 
57 Pothier's famous TRAirt DES OBLIGATIONS (1761) was translated into English by W.D. 
Evans in 1806. 
58 Remy, supra note 55, at 259-62. 
. 59 Article 5 of the Civil Code states that "judges are forbidden, when giv ng judgement 
m the cases which are brought before them, to lay down general rules of conduct. . .  ." C. 
CIV. art. 5 (Fr.). A judge who violated this prohibition was guilty of a criminal offense. CooE 
PEN-:1' [C. PEN.] art. 127 (Fr.) (repealed by the new Penal Code which came into force on Apnl 1, 1994). Article 5 was intended to prevent judges from returning to the old practice of 
�aking arrets de riglement, i.e., stating in a judgment a general rule to be applied in forthcom­
ing cases. 
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to 1 386. As already stated, Article 1 382, which is the first and principle 
Article of the Code relating to tort, is couched in very general terms.60 
This part of the Code is inspired, not by the pr�gmatism of th_e Ro_m�n 
lawyers but by the ideals of the 18th century philosophers, basmg liabil­
ity in tort on the principle of moral responsibility. According to the 
Civil Code, apart from a few exceptional cases where negligence was 
presumed, liability in tort was clearly based on the idea of fault. Evi­
dence had to be adduced that the damage had been caused by some 
form of negligence .61 
With the development of industrial m achinery, and the advent of 
the railroad and the internal combustion engine, principles underly­
ing the law relating to third-party liability became obsolete. For in­
stance, was it reasonable to ask the worker/victim of a workplace 
accident caused by a defective machine to prove, in order to recover 
damages, that the accident had been caused by some fault or negli­
gence of the employer? Was it fair to deny any remedy to the victim of 
a road traffic accident who had been behaving carefully but had not 
managed to convince a court that the driver had been negligent? Who 
was to bear the risk of such casualties: the innocent victim or the one 
who, by using the m achine, had created the risk? 
Two solutions were possible. The firs t  possibility was to ask the 
legislator to intervene, but there was too much controversy surround­
ing this option and the French legislators remained stubbornly pas­
sive. 62 The second solution was judicial, and, thanks to the creativity of 
the French judiciary-assisted of course by imaginative academics­
the legislature was allowed to sleep until 1985.63 In the meantime 
some judicial solutions had been found in the law of contract and the 
law of tort. 
A. Alibis in the Law of Contract 
In modernizing personal injury law, the courts relied on the law of 
cont�ac.
t whenever possible. If there was a contract of carriage between 
the victim and the carrier, the contract was said to include an implied 
60 C. crv. art. 1382 (Fr.); su sufrra note 5. 
61 C. crv. arts. 1382-1383 (Fr.) . 
. 
62 There were� few exceptions to this passivity such as the Law of April 9, 1898, which proVl�ed compensauon for workers who were victims of accidents suffered during the course of their employment. This statute has been replaced by the Law of October 30, 1946, CooE 
�Eu. s�cuRJTt SOCIALE art. L. 414 (Fr.), which provides for automatic but limited compensa­tion, 
6
';1thout any need t� prove the employer's negligence. 
. In �985, the National Assembly passed special legislation on road traffic accidents which proV1ded for a scheme of automatic compensation. C. crv. art. 1384 (94th ed. Petits Co�e.s Dalloz 1994) (Fr.) (codifying L. No. 85-677 of July 5, 1985). The provisio ns of this auxiliary statute are far more detailed than that of the proposed law of December 5, 1906 , �hich purported to revise the text of C. crv. art. 1386 by adding two paragraphs. See ARTHUR ·VON MEHREN &JAMES R. GoRDLEY, THE CML LAw SYSTEM 625 (2d ed. 1977). 
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obligation to carry the person safely (obligation de securite') .64 In th e 
case of railroad transportation, the courts hesitated in deciding the 
scope of this application. It  could start when the passenger entered 
the railroad station to buy h is ticket, or when h e  eventually bough t his 
ticket, and it would finish once he had left the station at the point of 
arrival. It  could even be limited to only exist during the actual act of 
transportation. Yet, even if it was fair to hold the carrier prima facie 
liable in the case of a crash, it was too much to hold him liable for 
breach of the safety obligation when the traveller had missed a step 
when boarding the train .  
Working on a distinction invented by a law professor,65 the con­
tractual obligation could be of two kinds. The first type of contractual 
obligation was an obligation de risultat, which can be described as the 
standard obligation to perform what is actually promised in the con­
tract, in which case nonperformance gives a right to damages without 
need to prove negligence. The second type of contractual obligation 
was an obligation de prudence et diligence, also known as an obligation de 
mayens. 66 In this type of obligation, the promisor only undertakes a 
duty of due care but is under no obligation to reach any particular 
outcome. The aggrieved promisee has to prove negligence if he wants 
to obtain damages. This second type of obligation is typically the one 
found by judges in contracts between medical practitioners and their 
patients. The victim of medical malpractice has a contractual action 
but must prove negligence. The physician has a contractual duty to act 
with reasonable care according to the present state of scientific knowl­
edge, but is under no duty to heal the patient.67 
Returning to railroad accidents, the courts ruled that the carrier's 
obligation to carry the person safely was an obligation de re'sultat begin­
ning when the passenger boarded the train and ending when he had 
stepped off. 68 When the accident happened inside the station, for in­
stance on the platform, the carrier still owed a contractual obligation, 
which was analyzed as an obligation de moyens. The victim therefore had 
to prove the carrier's negligence.69 
To avoid blurred distinctions as to the moment when the contrac­
tual obligation was incurred, the courts eventually ruled that when the 
accident h appened outside the scope of the contractual obligation de 
64 Judgment of Nov. 21, 1 9 1 1  (Compagnie generale transatlantique),  Cass. civ., 1913 
Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.) I 249 note L. Sarrut (Fr.). 
65 RENE. DEMOGUE, 5 TRAirt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL § 1237 ( 1925) . 
66 Id. For a detailed study, see generally JOSEPH FROSSARD, DE I.A DISTINCTION DES OBLI­
GATIONS DE MOYENS ET DES OBLIGATIONS DE REsULTAT (1965). 
67 Judgment of May 20, 1936, Cass. civ., 1936 Recueil Dalloz [D.P. I) I 88 rapport 
Josserand, Cone!. Matter, note E.P (Fr.) . 
68 Judgment of July 1, 1969, Cass. civ. Ire, 1969 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 640 note 
G.C.M. (Fr.) . 
69 Judgment of July 21, 1970, Cass. civ. Ire, 1970 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.) 767 note R. 
Abadir (Fr.) . . 
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resultat, for instance on the platform, before boarding the tr�in, or af­
ter having stepped off, the carrier 's liability was in tort. This was the 
case even if the passenger had already purchased his ticket. 70 T he con­
tractual obligation de mO'jens in rail transportation therefore can no 
longer apply. 
This evolution in the law is entirely judicial. The distinction be­
tween obligation de resultat and obligation de rrwyens does not appear in 
the Code. T he Cour de cassation, the court o f  last resort in t he French 
system, had to find some legislative support for the distinction . The 
effort was necessary in order for the Court to be able to determine 
whether, in the given circumstances, the court below had rightly de­
cided that this obligation was an obligation de resultat or an obligation de 
mO'jens. 
It was easy to j ustify the obligation de resultat, which is the typical 
contractual obligation. The court can resort to Art icle 1 1 4 7, w hich 
provides: 
The debtor is condemned, where this is appropriate, to the payment 
of damages, whether for the non-performance of the obligation or for 
delay in its performance, whenever he does not show that the non­
performance results from an extraneous event which cannot be im­
puted to him, even though there is no bad faith on his part.71 
This is a general provision of the Code covering any contractual obliga­
tion, unless otherwise agreed by the parties . 
The legal alibi for the obligation de mayens was found in Article 
1 137. According to t his Article, the obligation of looking after a t hing 
one has been entrusted with requires the person so obliged to exercise 
the care of a "good family father" ( bon pere de Jamill.e or bonus paterjamil­
ias) . 72 Through a curious analogy, travellers and medical patients are 
to be treated as well as things entrusted to bailees. 
No French jurists would question t his distinction, since it is sup­
ported by two articles in the Code. Its academic origin does not ap­
pear in any judgment. Indeed, French courts only cite statutes. The 
Co�� de cassati°'!1' never makes any express reference to cases or to legal 
wot.mg. Most mferior courts do likewise. French scholars are trained 
to accept this practice 73 and legal insiders will be able to trace t he aca­
demic origin of t he new theories upheld by the courts anyway.74 How-
70 Judgment of Mar. 7, 1989 (Valverde v. S.N .C.F.) ,  Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.) 1 note Ph. Malaurie (Fr.) . 
71 C. CJV. art. 1 147 (Fr.) . 
. 72 C. CJV. art. 1 137 (Fr.) .  This is a standard inherited from Roman law; it is the equivalent to the reasonable person in common law countries. . 73 The practice is radically different in Germany where books are commonly cited in Judgments rendered by the courts of highest jurisdiction. 74 French legal periodicals such as REcUEIL DALLoz-S1REY LA SEMAINE JuRIDIQUE, LA GAZE1TI. DU PALAis, usually publish judgments accompanied by a
0
note or commen t  written by a law professor a J'udge or " · · · d ·1 
h' 
• 
• a pracucmg attorney. These notes proVlde mterestmg eta1 s w •ch can�ot be found in the very short majority opinion. They refer to the non-legislative sources which do not appear in the court decision. Important Gour de cassation decisions are 
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ever, any rule of law applied by a court, regardless of whether it is 
actually of academic origins, has to be presented as if it followed logi­
cally from a legislative text. 
B. Alibis in the Law of Tort 
When no contract exists between the victim and the defendant, a 
solution had to be found in the law of torts. As indicated above, the 
Code based liability on fault, which includes lack of care and negli­
gence. 75 This is a general rule, to which the Code makes few excep­
tions, the whole law of torts being contained in no more than five 
articles. 76 
Article 1 384 paragraph I provides: "A person is liable not only for 
the damage he causes by his own act, but also for that caused by the 
acts of a person for whom he is responsible or by things that he has 
under his guard."77 This provision was designed to cover situations of 
vicarious liability: of employers for torts committed by their employ­
ees,78 parents' liability for their children,79 and the presumption that 
damage caused by an animal80 or by the collapse of a building81 is due 
to the negligence of its owner. 
Gradually, the Gour de cassation came to hold, on the basis of Arti­
cle 1384 paragraph 1 ,  that the guardian of a thing of any kind, not only 
animals or buildings, is prima fade answerable for any damage caused 
by the thing.82 Such stric t  liability may be pleaded not only when the 
damage comes from the thing itself (e.g., the explosion of a boiler) 83 
but also when the thing is manipulated by a person (e.g., an accident 
caused by a car in motion) . 84 The guardian, who was said by the Gour 
de cassation to be the person having the use, control, and direction of 
the thing,85 can only be exonerated by proving force majeure (i.e., that 
often published together with the report prepared by one of the three or five (or sometimes 
more) judges who have heard the case and/or with the comments made by the State Attor­
ney (Procureur general or Avocat general) . 
75 C. cw. arts. 1382-1383 (Fr.) .  
76 See C .  cw. arts. 1382-1386 (Fr. ) .  
7 7  C. CN. art. 1 384 para. I (Fr.) . 
78 C. CN. art. 1384 para. 5 (Fr. ) .  
7 9  C .  cw. art. 1384 para. 4 (Fr.) .  
8° C. CN. art. 1385 (Fr.) .  
81 c. CN. art. 1386 (Fr.). 
82 Judgment of Jan. 2 1 ,  1919 (Chemin de l'Ouest v. Marcault), Cass. civ., 1922 Recueil 
Dalloz [D.Jur.] 1 25 note G. Ripert (Fr. ) .  See VoN MEHREN & GoRDLEY, supra note 63, at 555-
702, which includes a translation of some of the cases and materials discussed in this section. 
For a comprehensive discussion, see E.A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of 
Things: A Study of judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REv. 1 299 ( 1988) . 
83 Id. 
84 Judgment of Feb. 13,  1930 (Jand'heur v. Les Galeries belfortaises), Cass. ch. reun., 
1930 Recueil Dalloz (D. Jur.] I 57 note G. Ripert (Fr.) .  
85 In a famous case where t h e  automobile that caused the damage had been stolen, the 
Cour de cassation held that the owner nonetheless retained the guard of it. Judgment of Mar. 
3, 1936 (Connot v. Franck), Cass. civ., 1 936 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] I 81 note R. Capitant 
(Fr. ) .  The case was remanded to a Court of Appeal that refused to hold the owner liable. 
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the damage was c aused by an irresistible, unforeseeable outside event) 
or the contributory negligence of the victim.86 
Many other refined distinctions have been developed, with no 
more legal suppor t than Article 1 384 paragraph 1 .  For instance, the 
Gour de cassation paid lip service to Artic le 1 384 in deciding a case deal­
ing with a building damaged by fire caused by the explosion of a televi­
sion set. In that  situation, the Court held the manufacturer and not 
the owner of the set liable, reasoning tha t  i t  was the manufacturer who 
guards the structure of the appliance. On the other hand, if the dam­
age was caused by a wrong use of the television set, the cour ts would 
decide that the user is liable, because he has the "guard of the behav­
ior" (garde du comportement) of the thing that caused the damage. Once 
again the Code provision providing the a libi for either rule is Article 
1384.87 
These interpreta tions are not necessarily wrong. They usually lead 
to a fair result. These examples are inte nded to show that  French 
judges are lawmakers and that the French Gour de cassation creates 
precedents, even if such precedents only have persuasive authority. 
But for the reasons set forth above, law making has to be done wi th an 
alibi of some Code provisions. 
IV. Conclusion: Judges Can Go "Beyond the Code but Through 
the Code" 
To justify such departures from the often obvious intention of the 
legislature, academics came to say that one had moved to a modern 
The Plenary Assembly of the Gour de cassation had to enter a final decision and this time held 
that the guardian was the thief and not the owner, because the latter had lost control of it 
and the former now had the use, the control, and the direction of the thing. Judgment of 
D�c. 2, 1941 (Franck v. Cannot) , Cass. ch. reun.,  1942 Recueil Dalloz [D.C. Jur.) 25 note G. 
Ripen (Fr.) .  
. 
86 The �ontributory negligence of the victim totally or partially exonerated the guard­
ian of the �lung. Judgment of Sept. 9, 1940, Cass. civ., 1 940 Recueil Dalloz [D.H. Jur.] 1 41 
(Fr.) .  Yet, m the Judgment of July 21,  1982 (Desmares), Cass. civ. 2i:me, 1 982 Recueil Dalloz 
[D. JUr.] 449 c�ncl. Charbonnier and note Ch. Larroumet (Fr. ) ,  the Gour de cassation held 
that �he VIcllm s fault. could only exonerate the guardian when the result was unforeseeabl� 
and insuperable. Th�s. �eory, extending the protection of the victims of road traffic 
acci­
dents, was strongly cntmzed. It was abandoned in 1 987 after the enactment of the Law No. 
8S-677 of July 22, 1985, which created a system of auto�atic compensation for victims of car 
accidents. Judgment of Apr. 6, 1987 (Chauvet and Mettetal) ,  Cass. civ. 2eme, 1 988 Recueil 
Dalloz [D.Jur.] 32 note Ch. Mouly (Fr.). The Gour de cassation then decided to move back to 
the former theory. Jd. 
87 Judgm�n.t of Nov. 30, 1 988, Cass. civ. 3e, 1988 Bull. Civ. II, No. 240. Inspired by Paul Roubier, the distinction has been created by Berthold Colman in his work DE LA DtTERMINA.· �UN DU GAROtEN REsPONSABLE DU FAIT DES CHOSES INANIMEES (1947) . See also Andre Tune, 
1 
;
5
rae
7 
]du Comportement et gar<k <k la Structure dans la Responsabiliti du Fait des Choses Jnanimies, .C.P. I, No. 1 384. 
T�e distinction was
_ 
first rejected by the Gour de cassation. Judgment of June 1 1 ,  1953, Cassj civ. 2e, l954 Recue1l Dalloz [D.Jur. ] 21 note R. Rodiere (Fr.). However, the distinction � ate
(
; u
)
pheld. J';'dgment of Nov. 12, 1975, Cass. civ. Ire, 1976J.C.P. II, No. 1 8479 note G. mey r. (explosion of a bottle of aerated water) . 
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method of interpretation. 88 When a provision is recent, the judge has 
to explain it and look for the legislative intention, wherever he may 
find it. He applies the exegetical method in its traditional sense. Yet, 
when the problem is new and the law was enacted at a time when the 
problem could not be anticipated, the judge is free to take into ac­
cou n t  equity and policy elements and to act as a legislator. Still, he 
must keep within the framework of the Code. 
At the beginning of the century, Saleilles put forth the magic 
formula "au deld du Code civil, mais par le Code civil": One has to go 
beyond the Code, but through the Code .89 To that extent, French 
l awye rs are expert magicians.90 This phrase actually points out the 
great paradox of the French attitude. The legislators should create all 
rules, and the powers of the courts, which are considered untrustwor­
thy, should be limited. Nevertheless, clear general rules continue to be 
preferred to detailed enactments, at least in matters covered by the 
Civil Code. So, let us allow the Cour de cassation to complement the 
legislative work, provided that they conceal the purely doctrinal91 or 
judicial origin of the rules they create and disguise it under the alibi of 
some general Code provision. They can find great support for such 
actions in the old tradition of s tating the law in judgments shorter than 
the headnote of a common law decision. 
88 FRANc;:ms GtNY, METHODES o'INTERPRETATION ET SouRcEs EN DROIT PRIVt Pos1TIF, ES­
SAJ CRITIQUE ( 1899). 
89 Raymond Saleilles, Preface to FRANCOIS GtNY, ScrENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DRorT PRIVE 
PosmF ( 1 9 13). 
" 90 Or legal priests of the next world, "Au-dew" meaning, when used substantively, the hereafter." Saleilles, at the end of his Preface, insisted on the importance of the term "Au­
deld," saying that it should become the watchword of all jurists. Id. 
91 In French law, the word doctrine is used in the sense of legal writing. 
